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Recent empirical studies of decisions by the Supreme Court of 
Canada have found that the justices appear to lack the overtly ideological 
voting patterns of justices on the United States Supreme Court.
1
 
However, voting patterns may change both across areas of law and over 
time. If justices do vote according to their own policy preferences or 
ideology in at least some appeals, Charter
2
 appeals would seem to be a 
fruitful area to search for such voting. Justices may vote in particular 
ways for reasons other than ideology, including a desire to exhibit 
consensus on an issue. A court may have different norms about 
consensus and these norms may also vary according to areas of law and 
across time. A norm of consensus in Charter appeals would, for example, 
mitigate a desire on the part of justices to vote according to their 
particular policy preferences. This article examines Charter judgments 
issued by the Supreme Court of Canada from the beginning of Chief 
Justice McLachlin‟s leadership of the Court in January 2000 to the end of 
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1  See Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “The Reasonable Justice: An Empirical Analysis 
of Frank Iacobucci‟s Career on the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 195; Benjamin 
Alarie & Andrew Green, “Should They All Just Get Along? Judicial Ideology, Collegiality, and 
Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 74 [hereinafter “Alarie & 
Green, „Should They All Just Get Along?‟”]; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Policy Preference 
Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 
[hereinafter “Alarie & Green, „Policy Preference Change‟”]; and Claire L. Ostberg & Matthew E. 
Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2007) [hereinafter “Ostberg & Wetstein”]. 
2  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
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March 2009. It seeks to identify the role of ideology and consensus in the 
decisions of the Court and to discuss the implications. 
The literature on ideological or attitudinal voting is particularly well 
developed in studies of the U.S. Supreme Court.
3
 These and related 
studies have found that American appellate justices, and particularly 
those on the U.S. Supreme Court, tend to vote in particular ways that 
seem to have a political valence. These studies generally group justices 
by certain indicators of ideological preference such as the party of the 
appointing president or how the justices were viewed ideologically at the 
time of appointment. For example, justices appointed by Democratic 
presidents tend to vote similarly to other justices nominated by Democratic 
presidents and these justices generally vote in a more “liberal” manner 
than Republican-nominated justices. These differences are most stark in 
appeals involving civil rights and freedoms. Nevertheless, despite this 
tendency to vote in accordance with policy preferences, the U.S. 
Supreme Court renders unanimous decisions in approximately 40 per 
cent of the appeals it hears.
4
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has tended to exhibit a different 
pattern. Although there is a connection between how justices vote and ex 
ante indicators of policy preferences, such as the party of the appointing 
Prime Minister or views of the justices in newspaper editorials at the 
time of appointment, this connection is weaker than in the U.S. 
Moreover, in Canada, this connection appears in the past to have been, if 
anything, even weaker in Charter appeals than in other types of appeals.
5
 
Further, there tends to be a greater norm of consensus on the Supreme 
Court in Canada than in the U.S., with the Supreme Court of Canada 
rendering unanimous decisions in about 60 per cent of the appeals it 
hears; this is half again as frequently as at the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which does so at a rate of about 40 per cent. 
However, voting tendencies do appear to change over time. These 
changes could be the result of a difference in the mix of appeals which 
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5  See Ostberg & Wetstein, supra, note 1; and Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change”, 
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come before the Court — that is, the voting preferences of the justices 
may remain the same over time but they may appear to vote in a more 
“liberal” or “conservative” direction because the nature of the appeals 
they hear has changed over time. Alternatively, the justices of the Court 
may alter their voting behaviour as the composition of the Court and the 
identity of colleagues change. For example, the substantive content of the 
appeals may remain the same over time but the particular composition of 
the Court may change as a justice leaves and another joins. The effect of 
these leavers and joiners may be either direct, as where the addition of a 
more conservative (liberal) justice changes the balance of voting on the 
Court in a more conservative (liberal) direction, or more indirect, where 
justices actually change their votes in the presence of justices more or 
less aligned with their own views.
6
 
In this article, we examine how justices on the Supreme Court of 
Canada voted in Charter appeals between 2000 and 2009.
7
 We choose to 
focus on Charter appeals as they have, at least in popular belief and 
possibly too in theory (on account of the relative newness of the issues in 
this area of the law),
8
 the potential to exhibit greater divergence in voting 
by judicial policy preferences. We attempt to assess whether there has 
been a tendency to ideological voting over this period. Moreover, this 
period covers the leadership of Chief Justice McLachlin. If there is a 
norm of consensus on a Court, it would seem likely that it at least in part 
is determined by the Chief Justice. Confining the analysis to this period 
therefore aids us in assessing the roles of ideology and consensus. 
Part II of this article sets out the theoretical framework for the 
analysis. It discusses the literature surrounding the voting behaviour of 
justices, including the three most prevalent general models of judicial 
decision-making: the attitudinal, strategic and legal models. It also 
discusses the role consensus may play in judicial decisions. Part III 
describes our data and the result of the analysis. It sets out the general 
trends in the Court‟s Charter decisions in this period, including the 
number of Charter appeals, the identity of the winning parties and the 
degree of unanimity. It then analyzes how individual justices voted in 
                                                                                                             
6  See Sunstein et al., supra, note 3, who discuss the role of panel composition on decision-
making in U.S. federal appellate courts. 
7  More specifically, our data includes 105 Charter appeals decided from January 2000 to 
the end of March 2009. A full list of the appeals is set out in Appendix A. 
8  See Peter McCormick, “Blocs, Swarms and Outliers: Conceptualizing Disagreement on 
the Modern Supreme Court of Canada” (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall L.J. 99 [hereinafter “McCormick, 
„Blocs‟”], discussing the impact of the Charter on levels of disagreement within the Court. 
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these appeals. Part IV ties the results of the analysis of Part III into the 
more general discussion of how justices have voted on the Supreme 
Court of Canada and the implications of these voting patterns. 
II. WHY DO JUSTICES VOTE AS THEY DO? 
1.  Ideology and Cooperation 
A considerable body of empirical literature has developed to try to 
explain why justices vote as they do. Three principal models have been 
developed, each admittedly insufficient on its own terms. First, the 
attitudinal model assumes that justices vote in large part based on their 
policy preferences. If, for example, a justice tends to have “liberal” 
policy views, he or she may more readily find in favour of an outcome of 
an appeal encompassing a more expansive view of equality rights.
9
 
Second, the “strategic” model assumes that justices do not “sincerely” or 
directly vote for their preferred policy outcome in each appeal, but 
instead they take into account how their votes in the particular appeal 
will affect and be affected by other factors such as other justices on the 
court and other institutions, such as the legislature.
10
 Finally, the “legal” 
model assumes that justices vote in accordance with legal principles and 
norms of statutory interpretation and precedent. In the case of ambiguity, 
justices attempt to interpret the statute in the manner most consistent 
with the aims of the statute or law as a whole. 
In this paper we examine two important dimensions of these models 
for judicial decision-making. The first dimension relates to the degree to 
which ideological views or policy preferences influence justices‟ 
decisions. This influence could arise consciously (where justices directly 
consider and vote in accordance with their ideological views) or 
unconsciously (where the views act indirectly on justices‟ votes, such as 
through unconsidered assumptions).
11
 At one extreme of this dimension, 
                                                                                                             
9  For a discussion of several models of judging, see Segal & Spaeth, supra, note 3.  
10  See, e.g., Epstein & Knight, supra, note 4, arguing justices should be viewed as voting 
strategically; Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau & Reginald S. Sheehan, Strategic Behaviour 
and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 
presenting a formal model of strategic decision-making by judges; Forrest Maltzman, James F. 
Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: The Collegial Game 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000) [hereinafter “Maltzman, Spriggs & Wahlbeck”]; 
and Segal & Spaeth, id.  
11  See Eric A. Posner, “Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial 
Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform” (Spring 2008) 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 853 [hereinafter 
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the justices of a court would be described as being ideologically 
“committed” or “interested”. At the other end of the spectrum, justices of 
a court would be described as being ideologically “disinterested” or 
“uncommitted”. Of course, it will sometimes and perhaps even usually 
be that the justices of the court vary significantly in the strength and 
nature of their ideological commitments.
12
 
The second dimension along which courts vary is the collegiality or 
cooperativeness of the decision-making process in which the justices 
engage. Such cooperation is an element of the strategic model. At one 
end of this dimension will be courts in which there is little or no give-
and-take, where justices attempt to independently determine the appropriate 
result in each appeal. These courts could be described as “uncooperative”, 
with each justice providing, in some sense, an “independent draw” as to 
the merits of the appeal. The term “uncooperative” is not necessarily 
intended to be pejorative; some justices may consider and reasonably 
value independence as the best means of ensuring sustained, internally 
consistent reasoned judgment by each justice. This lack of cooperation 
could be negative, on the other hand, if personal or ideological 
differences limit effective cooperation. One would expect such a court to 
regularly issue plurality opinions. 
At the other end of this spectrum, courts could be described as being 
“cooperative”. Justices on these courts may engage in more collegial, 
deliberative decision-making. They may also value speaking when 
possible in a united voice because, for example, they value clarifying the 
law and consolidating the possibly differing approaches taken to discrete 
legal issues by lower courts.
13
 There is also a possible negative side to 
the “cooperative” end of the spectrum if the apparent agreement arises 
not from deliberation but from justices trading off votes across appeals or 
areas of law in a judicial version of legislative logrolling. 
                                                                                                             
“Posner”], distinguishing between judges who allow their political biases to impact their decisions 
and those who do not, as well as between explicit or implicit bias. 
12  The discussion in this section is based on Alarie & Green, “Should They All Just Get 
Along?”, supra, note 1. 
13  Some courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, have a practice of from time to 
time issuing per curiam judgments that are not identified as having been authored by any particular 
justice. The Supreme Court of Canada has done this a number of times, including Quebec (Attorney 
General) v. Blaikie (No. 1), [1981] S.C.J. No. 30, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.); Reference re 
Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.); and Reference re Same-
Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (S.C.C.). Since January 2000 the Supreme 
Court of Canada has done this on nine occasions in Charter appeals; see Appendix A for a list of 
these nine inter alia judgments. 
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Figure 1: Quadrant Framework for Analyzing the  
Decision-Making Processes of Multi-Member Courts 
 
Recognizing that courts could vary along these two dimensions, the 
degree of ideological commitment and the degree of cooperativeness, 
suggests a four-quadrant framework for analyzing the decision-making 
processes of multi-member courts or panels. Courts in quadrant one 
are ideologically committed and uncooperative. Quadrant two courts are 
ideologically uncommitted and uncooperative. Quadrant three courts are 
ideologically committed and cooperative. Finally, quadrant four courts 
are ideologically uncommitted and cooperative. The following descriptions 
attempt to define the extremes in each quadrant (i.e., the corners), 
although any particular court at any particular time almost certainly lies 
inside these extremes. 
(a) Quadrant One: Ideologically Committed and Uncooperative 
This first quadrant is associated with the attitudinal model of judicial 
decision-making, in which justices are assumed to decide appeals 
principally in a way that satisfies their own policy preferences without 
regard to the strategic possibilities that might arise by cooperating with 
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other justices in the resolution of any given appeal.
14
 Courts situated in 
quadrant one, that is, courts whose justices are ideologically committed 
and uncooperative, will tend to issue a multiplicity of concurring 
opinions with an overall higher rate of dissents than the courts in other 
quadrants, all else the same. The number of opinions and the rate of 
dissent will be higher because the lack of cooperation means that 
individual justices will place little or no independent value on joining an 
opinion authored by a colleague. A justice will sign on to another‟s 
opinion only where she has a high degree of ideological consonance with 
the other justice in the particular appeal. If there is disagreement, a 
justice will prefer to author her own opinion rather than try, likely 
fruitlessly, to persuade her colleague to modify the reasons given for a 
certain outcome.
15
 There will also be a tendency towards a proliferation 
of opinions in the presence of certain pre-existing ideological commitments. 
Justices, or at least coalitions of ideologically similar justices, will less 
frequently agree on the merits of a particular decision and the reasons 
justifying that decision than in circumstances in which justices lack these 
ideological commitments. This second reason relates to the stickiness of 
justices to a certain position they have reached on an appeal and would 
influence both the level of agreement and the predictability of groupings 
of justices.  
(b) Quadrant Two: Ideologically Uncommitted and Uncooperative  
As with quadrant one, justices on quadrant two courts will place little 
or no value on agreeing for agreement‟s sake, but each justice will 
engage in a determined exercise to evaluate the appeal on its legal merits 
rather than on the basis of personal policy preferences. The second 
                                                                                                             
14  The attitudinal model of decision-making has for decades been popular among political 
scientists and is probably the most well-known and most frequently deployed model in the political 
science literature. See, the sources cited supra, note 3, as well as David W. Rohde & Harold J. 
Spaeth, Supreme Court Decision-Making (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1976), at 134-57; Jeffrey 
A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993); and Frank B. Cross, “Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case 
of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance” (1997) 92 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 251, at 265-79. 
15  This increase in the number of opinions holds all else constant such as, for example, 
workload. Justices may consider whether the (ideological) benefits of writing a separate decision is 
greater than the opportunity cost (due to the time cost of writing a decision), which may increase as 
the workload increases. For example, for the implications of workload in the context of decisions of 
Chief Justices of different courts, see Tracey George & Albert Yoon, “Chief Justices: The Limits of 
Attitudinal Theory and the Possible Paradox of Managerial Judging” (2008) 61:1 Vand. L. Rev. 1, a 
discussion of the impact of workload on judicial decision-making. 
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quadrant is associated with what legal theorists might call legal 
positivism and formalism — the idea that each appeal has a most valid or 
most defensible legal outcome, and that an ideologically uncommitted 
justice will strive to uncover the true legal merits of each appeal and 
decide on that basis. Justices of a quadrant two court may regard 
cooperation as suspicious, because it would suggest the possibility that a 
justice is open to compromising his or her own view of the underlying 
legal merits of an appeal in order to achieve some non-legal or policy 
goal. On such courts, suspicion and distrust of cooperation would 
influence the rate of dissenting or concurring opinions. However, 
because the legal authorities relevant to each appeal would be common 
to each justice, there would likely be less room for difference on 
ideologically uncommitted and uncooperative courts (quadrant two) than 
ideologically committed and uncooperative courts (quadrant one).
16
 
Provided that the range of ideologies of justices on quadrant one courts is 
broader than the likely range of ideologically uncommitted independent 
opinions of legal merit, a quadrant two court will tend to exhibit higher 
levels of agreement than quadrant one courts and less predictable 
groupings of justices. 
(c) Quadrant Three: Ideologically Committed and Cooperative 
Quadrant three courts are ideologically committed and cooperative. 
Its justices would be open to deciding appeals on the basis of policy 
preferences and, like the legal realists, would probably question the 
possibility of judging neutrally or objectively on the legal merits. Unlike 
quadrant one, however, the justices of a quadrant three court would 
selectively cooperate in order to achieve a better overall match between 
their own personal policy preferences and the outcomes produced by the 
court as a whole. Such cooperation could be attractive where justices 
work to understand each other‟s ideological commitments and use these 
understandings to produce well-reasoned and sharply divided opinions.
17
 
Alternatively, such cooperation could result from a process that more 
                                                                                                             
16  This will be the result so long as the variation in ideologically uncommitted assessment 
of legal merits varies less than the range of ideological commitments on quadrant one courts. This 
seems likely, though it will not necessarily be the appeal but would depend on the particular 
appointments process used for a given court and the composition of the court‟s docket. 
17  There is an argument to be made that such a court would appropriately belong in 
quadrant one rather than quadrant three if the votes of the justices are not affected by deliberation, 
only by the reasons given. Moreover, to the extent that the justices are willing to revisit their 
judgments, such courts will resemble quadrant four courts. 
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closely resembles the output of a legislature, where members are willing 
to trade votes and engage in episodic logrolling in order to promote their 
own individual agendas.
18
 A quadrant three court would tend to exhibit 
more agreement and fewer concurring or dissenting opinions than a 
quadrant one court. Whether a quadrant three court would exhibit more 
or less consensus than a quadrant two court would probably depend on 
the variety and intensity of the policy preferences of the justices, which 
would influence the mix of sharply divided opinions versus logrolling 
outcomes that would prevail. 
(d) Quadrant Four: Ideologically Uncommitted and Cooperative 
On an ideologically uncommitted and cooperative court, justices 
would tend not to steadfastly adhere to certain positions without taking a 
close look at the legal merits of the appeal and taking the existing law 
seriously. Further, the cooperative aspect means that the justices would 
be open to learning from and influencing each other in a good faith 
attempt at understanding fully the legal merits of the appeal, and 
collectively forging the reasoning that is most compelling. The consensus 
and cooperation may also arise from an emphasis on the public good 
function of decisions in the sense of more clearly settled law. Quadrant 
four courts will therefore exhibit the highest levels of consensus of any 
of the types of courts. Open judicial minds, abundant legal talent, mutual 
respect, diverse personal experiences and backgrounds, and effective 
communication would characterize an ideal quadrant four court. 
2.  Where Has the Supreme Court of Canada Been Located? 
Both quantitative and qualitative analyses are necessary to determine 
in which quadrant a particular court is located at any given time. 
However, as the above descriptions illustrate there are some quantitative 
characteristics of courts in the different quadrants. All else the same, the 
lowest rates of observed consensus will be associated with quadrant one 
courts and the highest rates of observed consensus will be associated 
with quadrant four courts. Quadrant one and three courts may also have 
                                                                                                             
18  This is consistent with the literature surrounding the “strategic” model of adjudication. 
For treatments of the strategic model, see Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, “Order in the Courts: A 
Neo-Institutional Approach to Judicial Consensus” (1989) 42 Western Political Quarterly 391; 
Epstein & Knight, supra, note 4, at 1-18; Maltzman, Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra, note 10. 
484 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
more predictable groupings than either quadrant two or four courts. The 
relative rates of consensus for quadrant two and quadrant three courts is 
unclear, and would depend on such factors as the legal talent of the 
justices in quadrant two (for example, greater legal ability may lead to 
more consensus) and the range and intensity of policy preferences of 
justices in quadrant three (for example, broader scope for logrolling may 
lead to more observed consensus).
19
  
Prior studies of the Supreme Court of Canada provide some evidence 
as to the location of the Court in the past. Earlier work has found a weak 
positive connection between how justices vote and indicators of 
ideology. In other work we have analyzed the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Canada using Martin and Quinn‟s methodology, which they 
developed and deployed in studying the U.S. Supreme Court.
20
 This 
method provides estimated “ideal point distributions” for each justice in 
all appeals in the post-Charter period. These ideal point distributions 
represent the ideological predispositions of the justices; in essence, they 
indicate which justices tend to vote in which direction. Our earlier 
analysis shows that with the exception of L‟Heureux-Dubé J., the justices 
seem to be closely clustered with each other, with considerable overlap 
in the distributions of their ideal points. Justice L‟Heureux-Dubé‟s ideal 
point was substantially to one side of those of other justices, with limited 
overlap. Interestingly, the party of the appointing Prime Minister turned 
out to be a poor predictor of where each justice‟s ideal point lay relative 
to other justices. While there was some connection between the ideal 
points and the party of the appointing Prime Minister, the Liberal and 
Conservative appointees were closely clustered and somewhat mixed 
together. The following figure presents the ideal points for Supreme 
Court of Canada justices in the 2000-2001 Term. Moving from left to 
right (and from more liberal to more conservative), the figure shows the 
ideal point distributions for Major J., Arbour J., Iacobucci J., Binnie J., 
LeBel J., McLachlin C.J.C., Gonthier J., Bastarache J. and L‟Heureux-
Dubé J. Four of the justices, Arbour J., Binnie J., LeBel J. and 
Bastarache J., were appointed by Liberal Prime Ministers. The five 
remaining justices were appointed by Progressive Conservative Prime 
Ministers. The results demonstrate not only how clustered our justices 
                                                                                                             
19  It is theoretically possible that a quadrant three court could exhibit even more consensus 
than a quadrant four court depending on the mix of policy preferences of the justices and by 
relieving some constraints on the bargaining, for example, by allowing for side-payments rather than 
in-kind, vote for vote trades. 
20  Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change”, supra, note 1.  
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are, with the obvious exception of L‟Heureux-Dubé J., but also how 
ineffective the appointing Prime Minister‟s party is likely to be as a 
proxy for the justice‟s policy preferences. 
Figure 2: Supreme Court of Canada Ideal Point Distributions  
2000-2001 Term 
 
In our earlier work we also undertook a more “direct” method of 
analyzing the connection between justices‟ votes and their ideology by 
categorizing votes in particular areas of law as “liberal” and 
“conservative”.
21
 A similar direct methodology has also found a 
connection in the U.S. between a justice‟s votes and the party of the 
appointing President, particularly in the area of civil rights and 
liberties.
22
 Consistent with the results using the Martin and Quinn 
method, we found a weak connection between the voting pattern of a 
justice and the party of the Prime Minister who appointed the justice. 
                                                                                                             
21  Id. 
22  See Nancy C. Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter J. Wiedenbeck, “The Ideological Component 
of Judging in the Taxation Context” (2007) Northwestern University School of Law, Public Law and 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 07-14 [hereinafter “Staudt, Epstein & 
Wiedenbeck”]. 
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These results are also consistent with other recent empirical studies of 
the Supreme Court of Canada.
23
 
In terms of levels of consensus, the Supreme Court of Canada 
rendered unanimous decisions approximately 60 per cent of the time in 
the period 1990-2000, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which rendered 
unanimous judgments about 40 per cent of the time.
24
 This level of 
agreement has varied over time, ranging from a high of approximately 87 
per cent in 1980 to a low of approximately 47 per cent in 1990.
25
 This 
higher rate of unanimity suggests that the Supreme Court of Canada is 
more oriented towards consensus in decision-making, although it is also 
consistent with other possible explanations, such as higher levels of 
logrolling (i.e., only apparent, not real, consensus), dispositional similarities 
among justices, and a less ideologically divisive docket (i.e., appeals that 
are easier “on the merits”). One reason to suspect that the Supreme Court 
of Canada may face a less ideologically divisive docket would be that in 
certain criminal appeals, accused persons may appeal as of right.
26
 
Another factor affecting the higher rate of unanimity on the Supreme 
Court of Canada may be the Court‟s frequent practice of sitting in panel 
sizes of seven or five instead of as a full panel of nine justices. The effect 
of smaller panel sizes may be mitigated to some extent, however, by the 
Court‟s tendency to assign fewer justices to appeals that are considered 
to be less controversial or divisive. Most important Charter appeals, for 
example, will be heard by all nine justices. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has been weakly ideological and 
relatively cooperative in the post-Charter period. It therefore may have 
been in quadrant one or three, but given the observed voting patterns of 
the justices, the Court as a whole could be in any one of the four 
quadrants and different justices may individually tend towards different 
quadrants. If the range of the justices‟ actual policy preferences happens 
                                                                                                             
23 Ostberg & Wetstein, supra, note 1. 
24  See, e.g., Peter McCormick, “„With Respect…‟ Levels of Disagreement on the Lamer 
Court, 1990-2000” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 89, at 97. According to McCormick, of the 959 appeals 
heard by the Lamer Court from 1990-2000, 58.4 per cent were decided unanimously. Some justices, 
perhaps not surprisingly, tended to vote together with greater frequency than others. See Peter 
McCormick, “Birds of a Feather: Alliances and Influences on the Lamer Court 1990-1997” (1998) 
36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 339. 
25  See McCormick, “Blocs”, supra, note 8, at 130. 
26  Over the period beginning with the start of the 2000 Term to the end of the 2008 Term, 
the Supreme Court of Canada heard on average 14.3 appeals per term as of right, comprising 21.6 
per cent of the Court‟s docket. See Supreme Court of Canada, “Statistics 1998-2008” (March 5, 2009), 
online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/stat/html/cat3-eng.asp> [hereinafter “Supreme Court of Canada 
Statistics”].  
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to be narrower than in the U.S., then the Canadian Court could be in 
quadrant one.
27
 Given the “brokerage” model of politics in Canada in the 
past and the lack of significant differences in policy preferences in most 
areas across parties, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s,
28
 the appointees 
to the Court may have been largely similar ideologically. The resulting 
voting behaviour would appear to be convergent, with small differences 
in voting patterns between justices appointed by Prime Ministers of each 
party corresponding to the small differences in ideology between the 
parties and appointees. Alternatively, the justices may be voting in 
accordance with their policy preferences in a strategic way through 
logrolling. That would place the Court in quadrant three.  
There are also explanations for the Court being in either quadrant 
two or four. The appointment process may have resulted in justices who 
do not vote in any particular ideological pattern, but who deliberate 
together to reach decisions. The resulting narrow distribution of voting 
patterns would then reflect the outcome of deliberation rather than the 
influence of initial policy preferences, placing the Court in quadrant four. 
Alternatively, the Court could be in quadrant two, where the justices do 
not vote according to personal policy preferences and do not cooperate, 
so long as the justices tend to independently arrive at the same 
conclusion. This result is possible but it seems more likely that the high 
level of agreement on the Court in this period is not associated with 
independent voting, but rather with cooperation. 
It is therefore difficult from the general data to determine confidently 
in which quadrant the Court has been located in the post-Charter period. 
                                                                                                             
27  There is some evidence that the initial differences between justices (as opposed to 
particular issues) do not vary significantly. Ostberg and Wetstein have ranked justices on a scale of  
-2 (very conservative) to +2 (very liberal) based on an analysis of newspaper editorials on the 
justices at the time of their appointment. Justices appointed by the Conservative Prime Ministers 
have had mixed rankings, with four justices considered to be conservative or very conservative, five 
considered liberal or moderately liberal, and one essentially neutral (Iacobucci J.). Those appointed 
by Liberal Prime Ministers, on the other hand, were predominantly liberal, with nine justices 
considered to be liberal or moderately liberal, one conservative (LeBel J.), and one neutral 
(Deschamps J.). See Ostberg & Wetstein, supra, note 1, at 55. These scores, which were set for most 
but not all of the justices in the period 1982 to 2004, are based on an analysis of editorials in nine 
Canadian regional papers. The methodology was originally developed for the U.S. Supreme Court. 
See Jeffrey Segal & Albert Cover, “Ideological Values and Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices” 
(1989) 83 American Political Science Review 557. Interestingly, these assessments of personal 
policy preferences do not appear to correspond in more than a weak way with the voting differences 
of justices upon appointment. See Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change”, supra, note 1. 
28  See, e.g., Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence Leduc & Jon H. Pammett, “Absent 
Mandate: Canadian Electoral Politics in an Era of Restructuring” in Hugh G. Thorburn & Alan 
Whitehorn, eds., Party Politics in Canada, 8th ed. (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2001) 398. 
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However, the general analysis may mask a clearer story hiding in the 
underlying data. In particular, in this article we focus on two factors 
which may impact the analysis. First, the levels of consensus and 
ideological voting may change over time. These changes may result 
because of a change in the justices on the Court. Some justices may be 
more or less ideological and cooperative than others, changing how the 
Court as a whole behaves in any particular term. Moreover, the Chief 
Justice may influence these factors.
29
 She may, for example, have 
particular norms about the optimal degree of consensus on the Court, 
may tend to set larger or smaller panels (thereby changing the likelihood 
of consensus) or, more controversially, use her power to select panels to 
influence voting on particular appeals.
30
 Second, particular types of 
appeals may be particularly divisive along party lines in Canada. If so, 
the ideological differences in particular types of appeals may be 
concealed underneath a more general tendency to vote non-ideologically 
and cooperatively. 
To test whether these factors may lead to a different sense of the 
Court‟s behaviour, in this paper we examine Charter appeals during the 
McLachlin era. At first glance, Charter appeals would appear to provide 
a basis for clear ideological differences which may show up in the 
connection of voting to ex ante indicators of ideology, the groupings of 
particular sets of justices and the levels of cooperation.
31
 Choosing the 
decisions under a particular Chief Justice allows us to at least notionally 
hold constant the influence of the Chief Justice in terms of norms of 
consensus and panel size and selection, assuming that she has been 
consistent in her approach to these issues over her tenure. The results of 
our analysis are set out in Part III.  
                                                                                                             
29  See McCormick, “Blocs”, supra, note 8, discussing levels of agreement and disagreement 
on the Court from the Fauteux Court onwards. 
30  See Benjamin Alarie, Andrew Green & Edward Iacobucci, “Is Bigger Always Better? On 
Optimal Panel Size, with Evidence from the Supreme Court of Canada” (October 28, 2008) 
University of Toronto Legal Studies Research Series No. 08-15, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1152322> [hereinafter “Alarie, Green & Iacobucci”]. 
31  See McCormick, supra, note 24, arguing that the Charter has led to increased 
disagreement on the Court. See also F.L. Morton, Peter H. Russell & Michael J. Withey, “The 
Supreme Court‟s First One Hundred Charter of Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis” (1992) 30 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, finding that after initial levels of agreement, levels of disagreement rose quite 
rapidly in Charter appeals. 
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III. IDEOLOGY AND COOPERATION ON THE MCLACHLIN COURT 
In order to examine the current trends in the Court concerning 
ideology and cooperation, we analyzed all the judgments of the Supreme 
Court of Canada coinciding with Chief Justice McLachlin‟s leadership. 
The appeals we examined thus run from (in neutral citations) 2000 SCC 
1 (judgment released January 13, 2000) to 2009 SCC 16 (judgment 
released April 2, 2009).  
Of the 689 judgments issued by the Court over this period, we 
focused on appeals which featured a Charter claim. The 105 judgments 
in which Charter claims were addressed were coded for a number of 
basic characteristics including the sections of the Charter that were raised 
by the claimant, whether the context for the claim was a criminal appeal 
(or extradition), whether the judgment of the Court was unanimous, how 
each justice voted, and whether the justice wrote reasons in the appeal. 
We used two methods to analyze these 105 Charter judgments. The first 
is a “direct method” in which we assign “conservative” and “liberal” 
labels to the judgments of the Court and its justices. The second is an 
“indirect” method popularized by political scientists Andrew Martin and 
Kevin Quinn in the study of the judgments and the justices of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which uses a flexible Bayesian methodology to “back-
out” the implicit policy preferences of the justices. We deploy this 
indirect method using the same 105 Charter decisions. The evidence 
regarding ideology and cooperation using the direct method is discussed 
first, followed by a discussion of the evidence as analyzed using the 
indirect method.  
1.  The Direct Method 
Using the direct method each judgment was assessed according to 
whether the judgment was in favour of the Charter claimant or in favour 
of the government. With one exception, a vote in favour of the claimant 
in each Charter appeal was considered to be “liberal” and a vote in 
favour of the government was considered “conservative”. The exception 
was in appeals involving a business making a Charter claim where a vote 
in favour of the claimant was considered to be conservative. This coding 
is based on an approach in recent studies of judicial behaviour in the 
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U.S.
32
 While there may be disagreements in the context of a particular 
appeal about whether the coding is an accurate description of particular 
appeals, the coding aids in determining whether the voting behaviour of 
the justice accords with other indicators of ideology.
33
  
The table below provides an overview of the Court‟s decisions in 
Charter appeals in this period. Using our definition of liberal and 
conservative decisions, the Court‟s liberal voting rate was 46.09 per cent 
over the relevant period. One popular way to look for the role of 
ideology on appellate courts is to examine voting differences according 
to the party of the appointing Prime Minister, or President in the U.S. 
context.
34
 Considering the universe of Charter appeals decided by the 
Court, the justices appointed by Liberal Prime Ministers were more 
likely to vote “liberally” than were their counterparts appointed by 
Conservative Prime Ministers (46.82 per cent versus 44.94 per cent). The 
margin, however, is not dramatic, and should be interpreted as relatively 
weak evidence of ideological voting over the set of Charter appeals 
considered as a whole. 
Table 1: Rates of “Liberal” Voting and Rates of Unanimity  
Across Charter Appeals 
 All Charter Criminal  Equality Non-Equality 
Number of judgments, 
2000-2009 
105 57 25 80 
Rate of “liberal” votes 
in aggregate 
46.09% 41.45% 50.00% 44.88% 
“liberal” vote rate by 
Liberal appointees 
46.82% 42.57% 55.20% 44.25% 
“liberal” vote rate by 
Conservative appointees 
44.94% 39.54% 41.98% 45.88% 
Unanimity rate 58.10% 61.40% 48.00% 62.50% 
                                                                                                             
32  See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra, note 3. For Canada, see Ostberg & Wetstein, supra, note 
1, C. Neal Tate & Panu Sittiwong, “Decision-making in the Canadian Supreme Court: Extending the 
Personal Attributes Model Across Nations” (1989) 51 Journal of Politics 900; and Donald Songer & 
Susan Johnson, “Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court of Canada” (Paper presented at 
the Midwest Political Science Association Meetings, 2002) [unpublished]. 
33  A list of the 105 Charter appeals and our coding of the judgment of the Court in each 
appears in Appendix A. 
34  See, e.g., Staudt, Epstein & Wiedenbeck, supra, note 22, at 3 and 5, describing a number 
of methods for estimating political preferences of justices. 
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The matters involved in Charter appeals arise in a wide variety of 
contexts that do not necessarily raise the same or even closely related 
issues. For that reason, we also examined two particular sub-categories 
of Charter appeals: section 15 equality claims and Charter appeals that 
involved criminal matters; there were a few appeals that raised both 
which are counted in each group. There were 57 Charter appeals in this 
period involving criminal charges or extradition,
35
 and 25 appeals 
involving section 15 claims. 
In the criminal appeals involving a Charter claim, the Court had a 
significantly lower liberal voting percentage (41.45 per cent) than for all 
Charter appeals (46.09 per cent) and exhibited a higher rate of unanimity 
(61.40 per cent versus 58.10 per cent for all Charter appeals). These 
differences may in part be because in certain criminal appeals (such as 
where there is a dissent at the appellate court) the accused person may 
appeal as of right.
36
 Such appeals are — at least on average, though of 
course not necessarily and not in all appeals — likely to pose legal issues 
that are somewhat less challenging and of somewhat less social 
importance than appeals heard by the Court with leave.
37
 Considering the 
criminal Charter appeals decided by the Court over this period, the 
justices appointed by Liberal Prime Ministers were more likely to vote 
“liberally” than were their counterparts appointed by Conservative Prime 
Ministers (42.57 per cent versus 39.54 per cent). The margin, although 
higher than for the universe of all Charter appeals decided by the Court 
over the period, was again not dramatic, and should be interpreted also as 
relatively weak evidence of ideological voting. 
Equality claims under section 15 of the Charter were significantly 
more divisive for the Court than the full set of Charter appeals and the 
subset of criminal Charter appeals. The number of liberal votes in 
equality appeals was precisely equal to the number of conservative votes 
(103 “liberal” votes versus 103 “conservative” votes) overall, which is 
more liberal than the Court‟s average over all the Charter appeals of 
46.09 per cent. Justices appointed by Liberal Prime Ministers were 
considerably more likely to vote liberally than were their counterparts 
appointed by Conservative Prime Ministers in equality appeals (55.20 
                                                                                                             
35  Included in this figure are a number of extradition appeals that might more appropriately 
be classified as immigration matters; however, we think that because the extradition process at issue 
typically involves criminal charges in another jurisdiction, they are appropriately classified as 
criminal for our purposes. 
36  See Supreme Court of Canada Statistics, supra, note 26. 
37  See Alarie, Green & Iacobucci, supra, note 30.  
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per cent versus 41.98 per cent). This margin, far higher than for the 
universe of all Charter appeals and the subset of criminal Charter appeals 
decided by the Court over the period, should be interpreted as relatively 
strong evidence of ideological voting in the context of section 15 
equality appeals. It is worth noting, however, that there were just 25 
equality appeals decided by the Court over this period, which does 
somewhat reduce the significance of this difference. 
Interestingly, the difference in liberal voting rates between justices 
appointed by Liberal Prime Ministers and those justices appointed by 
Conservative Prime Ministers appears to be driven entirely by the 
stronger proclivity among Liberal appointees to vote in a liberal way in 
equality appeals. In the 80 non-equality Charter appeals decided by the 
Court, Conservative appointees were actually slightly more likely to vote 
in a liberal way than were the Liberal appointees (45.88 per cent versus 
44.25 per cent). Thus, using the direct method there is relatively weak 
evidence for ideological voting along the lines of the party of the 
appointing Prime Minister, with the exception of equality appeals, where 
it seems that there is considerably stronger evidence.  
The following figure sets out the liberal voting percentages for each 
justice, which may assist in revealing attitudes in different areas for 
particular justices that are obscured by aggregating the results for justices 
appointed by the same Prime Minister. For example, although both 
Bastarache J. and Arbour J. were appointed by Prime Minister Jean 
Chrétien, the two justices tended to vote at opposite ends of the spectrum 
in Charter appeals. 
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Table 2: Proportion of “Liberal” Voting, Charter Appeals  
Supreme Court of Canada, 2000-2009 
 
Other noteworthy evidence emerging from the direct method is that 
although most justices are consistently liberal or conservative in both 
criminal and equality appeals, this is not always the case. Indeed, at least 
one justice, Major J., is liberal in criminal Charter appeals and 
conservative in equality appeals, and two justices, L‟Heureux-Dubé J. 
and Deschamps J., exhibit an opposite pattern of being relatively 
conservative in criminal appeals and relatively liberal in equality appeals. 
Thus, there is some evidence of individual policy preferences being 
expressed by justices, even if the expression of policy preferences by 
individual justices does not appear to reflect systematic differences by 
the appointing Prime Minister outside of the equality context. 
With respect to cooperation on the Court, there was a considerable 
degree of unanimity in Charter appeals during this period, which is 
consistent with the Court‟s practices in earlier periods. Significantly, 
more than half, 58.10 per cent, of the Charter decisions were decided 
unanimously, which is in line with the rates of unanimity prevailing 
under Lamer C.J.C. in the 1990s. Looking across the decisions of 
individual justices, there are differences in the willingness of different 
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justices to sign onto unanimous judgments, but overall the levels of 
unanimous decision-making is high, ranging from a low of 50 per cent 
for Rothstein J. to a high of 66.67 per cent for Charron J.
38
 With respect 
to siding with the majority of the other justices — something which an 
individual justice can control (the presence of a dissenter can destroy the 
prospect of a unanimous judgment), Charron J. stands out as a strong 
cooperator, siding with the majority of the Court (i.e., not dissenting or 
giving concurring reasons) in 97.2 per cent of the Charter appeals in 
which she has participated. The least cooperative justice using this metric 
is L‟Heureux-Dubé J., who sided with the majority at a rate of 72.7 per cent.  
Table 3: Disposition of All Charter Appeals 
Supreme Court of Canada, 2000-2009 
 
                                                                                                             
38  These justices may be outliers because of their relatively short tenure on the Court. We 
expect that their rates of participating in unanimous decisions will fall into line with the other 
justices as they participate in more Charter appeals.  
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As with the evidence on the role of ideology or policy preferences, 
equality appeals had a different pattern in terms of cooperation than 
Charter appeals more generally or appeals that raised both criminal and 
Charter issues. The most cooperative justices in equality appeals appear 
to be McLachlin C.J.C. and Rothstein J., Charron J., Iacobucci J. and 
Fish J., who each sided with the majority, i.e., did not dissent or offer 
concurring reasons, in more than 90 per cent of the equality appeals in 
which they participated. This norm of cooperation, however, was not 
shared by all the justices. For example, L‟Heureux-Dubé J. dissented in 
50 per cent, four of eight, of the equality appeals in which she 
participated during the tenure of McLachlin C.J.C. as Chief Justice, and 
cooperated in just 37.5 per cent of the equality appeals over this period 
(which is low even compared with her cooperation rate of 72.7 per cent 
in all of her Charter appeals). Justice Arbour dissented in 25 per cent 
(three of twelve) of the equality appeals she participated in deciding and 
cooperated in just 58.3 per cent of the equality appeals in which she 
participated, far below her overall cooperation rate in all Charter appeals 
of 80.2 per cent. 
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Table 4: Disposition of Equality Charter Appeals 
Supreme Court of Canada, 2000-2009 
 
Taken as a whole, the direct method of analyzing the 105 Charter 
appeals decided since January 1, 2000 suggests that there has been a 
relatively low level of ideological voting overall, and a relatively high 
level of cooperation among the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The one exception is in the context of equality appeals, where it appears 
that the party of the appointing Prime Minister carries some information 
about the policy preferences of the justices.  
2.  The Indirect Method 
Because of the potential contestability of the liberal and conservative 
coding of votes, we also analyzed the data using the method developed 
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by Martin and Quinn (which we refer to as the indirect method).
39
 This 
method provides an ideal point distribution for each justice in Charter 
appeals in this period. These ideal point distributions are supposed to 
represent the latent policy preference predispositions of the justices — 
that is, they are expected to indicate which justices tend to vote in which 
direction. The indirect method is based on the Bayesian estimation of a 
one-dimensional item response theory model using a computationally 
intensive Markov chain Monte Carlo process.
40
  
A number of assumptions are made in setting up the model of 
judicial decision-making that underlies the method. First, it is assumed 
that the relevant attitudinal or policy space is one-dimensional — i.e., a 
line or spectrum. Second, the model assumes implicitly that justices vote 
in accordance with their simple preferences, in keeping with an 
attitudinal model of decision-making.
41
 We do not model any strategic 
interactions between the votes of different justices, and ignore any 
potential “panel effects” that may arise from certain justices being 
affected by the presence of other justices on the same panel.
42
 Thus, a 
vote to affirm indicates that, given their ideal policy point, affirming 
gives a particular justice more utility than reversing the appeal. In 
addition, because of the small number of appeals (n=105), Bayesian 
priors (“positive” or “negative”) were assigned to the justices with the 
two highest and two lowest rates of finding in favour of Charter 
claimants. 
                                                                                                             
39  See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, “Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999” (2002) 10 Political Analysis 134; 
Martin et al., supra, note 3; Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, “The Median 
Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court” (2005) 83 N.C.L. Rev. 1275; and Andrew D. Martin & Kevin 
M. Quinn, “Assessing Preference Change on the U.S. Supreme Court” (2007) 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 
303. Martin and Quinn maintain a website on which they report updated empirical findings as new 
decisions are rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court. The website is accessible online: 
<http://mqscores.wustl.edu/>. 
40  See Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change”, supra, note 1, for a more detailed 
discussion of the method and its implications in the Canadian context. 
41  This assumption can be supported on the basis that given that the Martin-Quinn method 
uses only non-unanimous appeals, these are appeals in which justices truly do have the discretion to 
go either way in their disposition of the appeal. 
42  This is an oversimplification. Research by Cass Sunstein in the United States has shown 
that panel effects can be significant on Circuit Courts of Appeal: see Sunstein et al., supra, note 3. 
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Figure 3: Estimated Ideal Point Distributions in All Charter Appeals 
Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada, 2000-2009 
 
Note: Judges are listed in the legend in left to right order, based on the mean of each 
judge‟s ideal point distribution. 
The results of the indirect method are similar to the analysis of the 
liberal percentage voting records of the justices. The result of the indirect 
method considering all the Charter appeals in the period is a weak 
correlation between the party of the appointing Prime Minister and the 
justices‟ mean ideal points, not unlike the result under the direct method. 
For all Charter appeals, the average mean of the ideal point distributions 
for Liberal appointees is +0.135 versus -0.439 for Conservative appointees, 
resulting in a gap in the mean of the ideal point distributions of 0.574. 
The results were similar for the difference between the average mean of 
the ideal point distributions with only criminal Charter appeals considered, 
with Liberal appointees having an average ideal point of 0.222 and 
Conservatives of -0.281. Finally, the differences were again similar for 
the average mean of the ideal point distributions of the justices in 
equality appeals, with Liberal appointees having an average ideal point 
of 0.308 and Conservative appointees of -0.281. These results appear to 
support the idea that Conservative appointees tended to vote slightly 
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more conservatively than Liberal appointees overall. However, the 
results are not as consistent with the findings of the direct method with 
respect to the particularly divisive nature of the equality appeals. 
It should be emphasized, however, that when all Charter appeals are 
grouped together, the ideal point distributions of the justices may in some 
appeals be misleading. This is particularly the case for those such as 
Major J., who is liberal in criminal Charter appeals and conservative in 
equality appeals, and L‟Heureux-Dubé J. and Deschamps J., who tend to 
be conservative in criminal Charter appeals and liberal in equality 
appeals. These peculiarities are illustrated by the following diagram, 
which shows, for example, that even though McLachlin C.J.C. and Major 
J. had a very similar ideal point distribution when all Charter appeals are 
analyzed, their manner of reaching that estimated ideal point distribution 
was very different, with Major J. being quite liberal in criminal Charter 
appeals and quite conservative in equality appeals, whereas McLachlin 
C.J.C. tended to be a consistent centrist.  
Table 5: Estimated Mean Ideal Points, Charter Appeals 
Supreme Court of Canada, 2000-2009 
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The upshot of the part of the analysis involving the indirect method 
is that the justices of the Court have a high degree of overlap in their 
ideal point distributions when all Charter appeals are considered. This 
overlap implies a relatively unpredictable pattern of which justices will 
join a majority opinion or dissent. The indirect method tends to produce 
results with more sharply defined distributions when, as at the U.S. 
Supreme Court, there are fairly predictable ways in which panels will 
split (if and when a panel splits). The relative lack of predictability in 
Canada and the overlap in the ideal point distributions found using the 
indirect method in turn suggests that the Court has been neither overly 
ideological nor uncooperative in the post-2000 period under Chief 
Justice McLachlin with respect to Charter decisions. 
IV. WHICH QUADRANT BEST FITS THE SUPREME COURT  
OF CANADA? 
As noted previously, quantitative and qualitative analysis is 
necessary to fully understand the decisions of the Court. The results of 
the analysis in Part III provide some evidence of where the Court has 
been located in a particular time period and in a particular area of law. 
The Charter appeals in the McLachlin era do exhibit some distinct 
patterns in terms of both ideology and cooperation. These patterns have 
important implications for issues such as the appropriate appointments 
process for the Court. 
Before discussing the implications for the appointment process, it is 
important to draw out some of the findings in terms of this framework. 
The results of Part II show that generally there has been a very high rate 
of cooperation for Charter appeals in this period. The rate of unanimity 
for all Charter appeals was high. However, the high rate of unanimity 
obscures significant differences across justices and areas of law. The one 
notable exception was that in equality appeals justices tended towards 
fewer unanimous decisions, but at the same time also tended to have 
fewer dissents and a greater than average number of concurring 
judgments. The implication of these results is that in general the Court in 
Charter appeals has been slightly more cooperative than for all appeals it 
decides, but for equality appeals the Court has tended to be less 
cooperative. 
In terms of ideology, there is a weak correlation between justices on 
the McLachlin Court and indicators of ideology when all Charter appeals 
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are considered together. This weak correlation also holds for criminal 
Charter appeals and is similar to results for all appeals found in prior 
empirical studies.
43
 However, once again equality appeals exhibit a 
different pattern. The correlation between ideology and voting in equality 
appeals in this period appears much greater than in either general Charter 
appeals, criminal Charter appeals or in prior analysis of all appeals in the 
post-Charter period. One telling indicator is that the liberal voting 
percentage for Liberal appointees is 14 per cent higher than for 
Conservative appointees in equality appeals in this period. Interestingly, 
an earlier study by Ostberg and Wetstein had found ideology to be 
insignificant in equality cases, although it also found a significant 
difference in liberal voting rates. However, their study was over a 
different time period and involved equality cases beyond those that 
invoked section 15 of the Charter.
44
 
The implication for the location of the Court over this period is that 
if all Charter appeals are grouped together, the Court appears to be in a 
similar position to an analysis of all appeals lumped together. The Court 
appears to be weakly ideological and cooperative, although still slightly 
further towards the cooperative end of the spectrum than for all appeals. 
For criminal Charter appeals, the Court is pushed even further towards 
the cooperative end. However, the results for all Charter appeals and for 
criminal Charter appeals may be partially influenced by the criminal 
appeals which came before the Court as of right. In these appeals either 
an acquittal was overturned on appeal or the appellate court was split in 
its decision. These appeals should, on average, tend to be easier on 
average than other appeals and tend to be assigned smaller panels. These 
factors should mean these appeals would tend to exhibit higher rates of 
cooperation.
45
 Further, if we assume a higher than average rate of 
dismissal for these appeals (because these appeals are guaranteed an 
appeal where an acquittal is overturned, regardless of the merits of the 
appeal) and these dismissals are coded as conservative, they will tend to 
make both Liberal and Conservative appointees appear more 
                                                                                                             
43  Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change”, supra, note 1. See also Ostberg & 
Wetstein, supra, note 1, finding correlation between criminal appeals involving right to counsel or 
search and seizure issues and ideology as measured by the party of the appointing Prime Minister to 
be positive but insignificant, but finding a stronger and significant correlation with ideology as 
measured by scores based on newspaper editorials at the time of the appointment of the particular 
justice. 
44  Ostberg & Wetstein, id. They include s. 15 cases as well as cases under provincial human 
rights legislation.  
45  See Alarie, Green & Iacobucci, supra, note 30. 
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conservative, potentially disguising a difference in appeals where there is 
an actual dispute. An indication that the appeals for which leave to 
appeal was sought may in fact be quite divisive is that the rate of dissents 
is high for all criminal Charter appeals despite the overall level of 
unanimity expected for as of right appeals. 
However, while there may not be an apparent difference in Charter 
or criminal Charter appeals, there does appear to be a difference for 
equality appeals in the McLachlin era. The Court in these appeals 
appears to be less cooperative — that is, there is less unanimity — but at 
the same time there is a high rate of concurrences. The high rate of 
concurrences points to justices finding value in presenting their own 
ideological views rather than in speaking in a single voice. Moreover, 
there is a stronger connection between indicators of ideology and voting 
in equality appeals. For example, there is a larger difference in the 
average liberal voting percentages between Liberal and Conservative 
appointees (an approximately 14 per cent difference for equality appeals 
as opposed to about 5 per cent for criminal Charter appeals and 4 per 
cent for all Charter appeals). The Court in equality appeals therefore may 
be located more towards quadrant one — that is, less cooperation and 
more ideology. The higher rate of agreement of the justices in the 
majority of areas of law may dominate the differences in the divisive 
areas when considering the Court‟s decisions quantitatively as a whole. 
Quadrant three is also a possibility.
46
 
However, there are some interesting features in the voting by 
particular justices which point to individual justices being in different 
quadrants. First, there are significant differences in how justices voted, 
both in ideology and cooperation. For example, the spread between the 
highest and lowest liberal voting percentages is 25.4 per cent for all 
Charter appeals, 28.5 per cent for criminal Charter appeals, and 47.2 per 
cent for equality appeals. In terms of cooperation, the rates of justices 
signing onto either unanimous or majority judgments varies widely from 
97.2 per cent to 72.7 per cent for all Charter appeals, 96 per cent to 69.2 
per cent for criminal Charter appeals, and 100 per cent to 37.5 per cent 
for equality appeals. These large differences indicate significant variance 
in individual approaches to these issues which may mean that, at least at 
the extremes, different justices will be in different quadrants — they may 
conceive of the judicial role quite differently. 
                                                                                                             
46  See Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change”, supra, note 1, discussing the 
differences in preferences by parties in particular areas. 
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Second, some justices shift their positions across areas of law 
significantly. Justices Major and Charron provide interesting examples. 
Justice Major changes from having the median liberal voting percentage 
for criminal Charter appeals to having the lowest liberal percentage 
voting rate for equality appeals. This shift can also be seen in the shift 
from the right to the left of the distribution in terms of ideal policy 
points. Justice Charron exhibits an opposite pattern. She had a low liberal 
voting percentage relative to the Court for criminal Charter appeals, but 
was at the Court‟s average for liberal voting in equality appeals. In terms 
of mean ideal points, she moved from the left of the Court‟s average 
mean ideal point for criminal Charter appeals to the right for equality 
appeals. These differences make it difficult to pinpoint a particular 
justice‟s attitude across all areas of law. 
Third, the voting record of McLachlin C.J.C. raises interesting 
questions about her role on the Court, both in terms of the voting by 
other members and any norm of cooperation. In terms of voting, she is 
quite clearly in the middle of the distribution. This middle position is 
seen most starkly in the ideal point diagrams, where she rests squarely in 
the middle. It can also be seen in the liberal voting percentage data as she 
is essentially at the median for all Charter appeals, for criminal Charter 
appeals and for equality appeals. She is also only slightly above the 
average liberal voting percentage for all Charter appeals and slightly 
below for criminal Charter appeals and equality appeals. In terms of 
cooperation, she has very high (and well above average) rates of signing 
onto majority or unanimous decisions in all three categories and below-
average rates of concurrences and dissents. 
Chief Justice McLachlin‟s voting patterns could indicate that she 
fosters cooperation and brings other justices to a common position.
47
 
This cooperative role would mean that her voting would appear at the 
mean/median of the liberal voting rates and her ideal point would be at 
the centre of the distribution. She may be able to achieve such 
cooperation through deliberation and fostering a norm of consensus. She 
may, on the other hand, at least partially be able to bring about such 
convergence through her ability to select panel sizes and compositions. A 
Chief Justice‟s power to select panels provides an opportunity to both 
reduce panel sizes on certain appeals (which raises the likelihood of 
agreement) and select compositions which are more likely to foster a 
                                                                                                             
47  See McCormick, supra, note 24, arguing that the identity of the Chief Justice has 
mattered over time to the level of disagreement on the Court. 
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particular policy outcome. More empirical study is needed of the ability 




What does all this mean for the evolution of the Supreme Court? It is 
clear that the role of ideology and cooperation will vary by area of law. 
While there may not be an obvious concern with the Court as it votes as 
a whole, the identity of those on the Court and on particular appeals will 
matter in some areas. This connection in turn makes the appointments 
process matter. However, the key question is — matter in which 
direction? Does this point in the direction of the need for a more neutral 
appointments process? Eric Posner points out that to the extent that there 
is a single correct answer to a particular issue, a more neutral process 
with the aim of not having ideologically inclined justices may be 
preferable.
49
 However, the risk with such a process is that it produces 
“safe” appointments that do not bring a diversity of views to issues.
50
 A 
diversity of views may be desirable if an issue does not admit of a single 
correct answer and the difference across justices permits greater debate 
and deliberation on the issues.
51
 
Does this mean that we should want a more politicized appointments 
process? Such a process, like that in the U.S., may allow more thorough 
vetting of possible appointees and therefore a more informed choice. 
Further, politicization may allow a greater connection between the views 
of the appointees and the prevailing public opinion. To the extent there is 
no single correct answer to particular issues, it is possible that some 
greater connection to public opinion may be desirable.
52
 The difficulty is, 
of course, that such vetting may lead to less predictable judgments and 
potentially to greater tendency towards logrolling. Further, Posner argues 
that there may be an insufficient pool of legally competent, ideologically 
diverse justices. There would then be a trade-off between the benefits 
from diversity and the loss of legal competence.
53
 
The focus on Charter decisions has shown that the area of law 
appears to matter to the issue of in which quadrant the Court is located. 
While examinations of the general voting behaviour by the Court are 
                                                                                                             
48  See Alarie, Green & Iacobucci, supra, note 30, for an initial discussion of panel sizes. 
49  Posner, supra, note 11. 
50  Peter Hogg, “Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein to the SCC” (2006) 44 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 527. 
51  Posner, supra, note 11. 
52  Id. 
53  Id. 
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necessary and interesting, there is more to be gleaned by breaking down 
the voting into types of appeals. Yet in this analysis even the category of 
Charter appeals proved to be too large. The real wedges in terms of 
ideology and cooperation did not appear until equality appeals were 
examined. The current appointment process may provide the Prime 
Minister with the ability to appoint justices who, while on most issues 
are rather neutral, steer the Court in a particular direction in a narrow 
class of issues.  
Moreover, the appointments will have different implications in 
different areas. To the extent that justices are clustered in their views on 
an issue, the addition of a justice, even extreme, to the left or right of that 
cluster is likely to have little influence on the identity of the median voter 
— that is, the voter whose vote is pivotal to gaining a majority. However, 
on the more clearly divided issues, the influence of a more extreme 
justice may be similar to that in the U.S. — the identity of the leavers 
and joiners on the Court becomes important in a range of important 
social issues.
54
 Replacing a left-leaning justice with a right-leaning 
justice can make a considerable difference. It is the received wisdom in 
the U.S. that Republican Presidents attempt to add justices to the right of 
the median justice, and Democratic Presidents attempt to add justices to 
the left of the median.
55
 The appointment of an ideological justice with 
more extreme views could therefore lead to changes in particular areas of 
law where there is a significant difference in ideological views. In 
Canada, this difference could be hidden within the apparent more overall 
agreement. If so, a Prime Minister may be able to change the voting in a 
particular area, but this may not be reflected in the more global measures 
of how justices vote. It may also have multiplying effects as the justices 
have discretion to choose a large percentage of the appeals they hear and 
                                                                                                             
54  This importance assumes that a justice‟s voting is stable or predictable over time or, at 
very least, in the short run. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Valerie Hoekstra, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. 
Spaeth, “Do Political Preferences Change?: A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices” 
(1998) 60 Journal of Politics 801 [hereinafter “Epstein, Hoekstra, Segal & Spaeth”] and Lee Epstein, 
Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, “Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court 
Justices: Who, When and How Important?” (2007) 101 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1483. There has been no clear 
pattern of change in voting patterns by justices over time on the Supreme Court of Canada. See 
Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change”, supra, note 1. The implications of changes, however, 
will depend on the initial starting points. Even if justices‟ votes may change in either direction (more 
liberal or more conservative), if the change is relatively small it may not make a difference in the 
ultimate outcome on a heavily split court if the change occurs in the justices at either extreme. It will 
be the shifts in the justices towards the middle that will matter most. 
55  For a discussion of appointments and changing attitudes, see Epstein, Hoekstra, Segal & 
Spaeth, id. 
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ideology has the potential to play a role in which appeals come before 
the Court. 
The power to appoint justices may therefore not appear on its face to 
have produced swings in the Court or even an overtly politicized Court in 
the post-Charter era. However, more work is needed on specific areas of 
law to make that claim. It may be that appointing an ideologically 
disinterested court is impossible, and that ideological interests will 
merely depend on the composition of the appointing committee. It is 
even arguable that it is not, as noted above, desirable to have an 
ideologically disinterested Court (a catamaran is, after all, more stable 
than a kayak). A more transparent process may, however, impose more 
discipline on the ability of future Prime Ministers to use the appointments 
power to steer the Court on particular issues, if not on all issues. 
APPENDIX A 
Style of Cause Citation Decision s. 15 Criminal By the 
Court? 
Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward 
Island 
[2000] S.C.J. No. 17, 
2000 SCC 1 
liberal - - - 
Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration) 
[2000] S.C.J. No. 29, 
2000 SCC 28 
conservative yes - - 
Lovelace v. Ontario [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, 
2000 SCC 37 
conservative yes - - 
R. v. Morrisey [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, 
2000 SCC 39 
conservative - yes - 
Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human 
Rights Commission) 
[2000] S.C.J. No. 43, 
2000 SCC 44 
conservative - - - 
R. v. Darrach [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, 
2000 SCC 46 
conservative - yes - 
Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. 
W. (K.L.) 
[2000] S.C.J. No. 48, 
2000 SCC 48 
conservative - - - 
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. 
Canada (Minister of Justice) 
[2000] S.C.J. No. 66, 
2000 SCC 69 
conservative yes - - 
R. v. Latimer [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, 
2001 SCC 1 
conservative - yes yes 
R. v. Sharpe [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, 
2001 SCC 2 
conservative - yes - 
United States v. Burns [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, 
2001 SCC 7 
liberal - yes yes 
U S A v. Kwok [2001] S.C.J. No. 19, 
2001 SCC 18 
conservative - yes - 
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U S A v. Cobb [2001] S.C.J. No. 20, 
2001 SCC 19 
liberal - yes - 
U S A v. Tsioubris [2001] S.C.J. No. 21, 
2001 SCC 20 
liberal - yes - 
U S A v. Shulman [2001] S.C.J. No. 18, 
2001 SCC 21 
liberal - yes - 
R. v. Ruzic [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, 
2001 SCC 24 
liberal - yes - 
R. v. Dutra [2001] S.C.J. No. 30, 
2001 SCC 29 
conservative - yes - 
R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd. [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, 
2001 SCC 70 
liberal - yes - 
R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc. [2001] S.C.J. No. 79, 
2001 SCC 81 
conservative - - - 
R. v. Hynes [2001] S.C.J. No. 80, 
2001 SCC 82 
conservative - yes - 
R. v. Golden [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, 
2001 SCC 83 
liberal - yes - 
Smith v. Canada (Attorney General) [2001] S.C.J. No. 85, 
2001 SCC 88 
conservative - - yes 
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, 
2001 SCC 94 
liberal yes - - 
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) 
[2002] S.C.J. No. 3, 
2002 SCC 1 
liberal - - yes 
Ahani v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) 
[2002] S.C.J. No. 4, 
2002 SCC 2 
conservative - - yes 
R.W.D.S.U. Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola 
Canada  
[2002] S.C.J. No. 7, 
2002 SCC 8 
liberal - - - 
R. v. Law [2002] S.C.J. No. 10, 
2002 SCC 10 
conservative - yes - 
Mackin v. New Brunswick; Rice v. New 
Brunswick 
[2002] S.C.J. No. 13, 
2002 SCC 13 
liberal - - - 
R. v. Guignard [2002] S.C.J. No. 16, 
2002 SCC 14 
liberal - yes - 
Lavoie v. Canada [2002] S.C.J. No. 24, 
2002 SCC 23 
conservative yes - - 
Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada 
(Attorney General); R. v. Fink 
[2002] S.C.J. No. 61, 
2002 SCC 61 
liberal - yes - 
R. v. Hall [2002] S.C.J. No. 65, 
2002 SCC 64 
conservative - yes - 
Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral 
Officer) 
[2002] S.C.J. No. 66, 
2002 SCC 68 
liberal yes - - 
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Laroche [2002] S.C.J. No. 74, 
2002 SCC 72 
conservative - yes - 
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Court? 
R. v. Jarvis [2002] S.C.J. No. 76, 
2002 SCC 73 
conservative - yes - 
R. v. Ling [2002] S.C.J. No. 75, 
2002 SCC 74 
conservative - yes - 
Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General) [2002] S.C.J. No. 73, 
2002 SCC 75 
liberal - - - 
Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. 
Walsh 
[2002] S.C.J. No. 84, 
2002 SCC 83 
conservative yes - - 
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General) [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, 
2002 SCC 84 
conservative yes - - 
Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney 
General) 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 69, 
2003 SCC 3 
liberal yes - - 
R. v. A. (P.) [2003] S.C.J. No. 19, 
2003 SCC 21 
conservative - yes - 
R. v. Buhay [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, 
2003 SCC 30 
liberal - yes - 
Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General) 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 32, 
2003 SCC 34 
liberal yes - - 
Ell v. Alberta [2003] S.C.J. No. 35, 
2003 SCC 35 
conservative - - - 
Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General) [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, 
2003 SCC 37 
liberal - - - 
Nova Scotia v. Martin; Nova Scotia v. 
Laseur 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 54, 
2003 SCC 54 
liberal yes - - 
R. v. B. (S.A.) [2003] S.C.J. No. 61, 
2003 SCC 60 
conservative - yes - 
Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia [2003] S.C.J. No. 63, 
2003 SCC 62 
liberal - - - 
Vann Niagara Ltd. v. Oakville (Town) [2003] S.C.J. No. 71, 
2003 SCC 65 
liberal - - - 
Maranda v. Richer [2003] S.C.J. No. 69, 
2003 SCC 67 
liberal - yes - 
R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, 
2003 SCC 74 
conservative - yes - 
R. v. Clay [2003] S.C.J. No. 80, 
2003 SCC 75 
conservative - yes - 
Canadian Foundation for Children, 
Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney 
General) 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 
2004 SCC 4 
conservative yes - - 
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General) [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, 
2004 SCC 33 
conservative - - - 
Application under s. 83.28 of the 
Criminal Code (Re) 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 40, 
2004 SCC 42 
conservative - yes - 
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R. v. Demers [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, 
2004 SCC 46 
liberal yes yes - 
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, 
2004 SCC 47 
liberal - - - 
Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah 
de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine 
(Village) 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 45, 
2004 SCC 48 
liberal - - - 
R. v. Mann [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 
2004 SCC 52 
liberal - yes - 
Hodge v. Canada  [2004] S.C.J. No. 60, 
2004 SCC 65 
conservative yes - - 
Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. 
N.A.P.E. 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 61, 
2004 SCC 66 
conservative yes - - 
R. v. Tessling [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 
2004 SCC 67 
conservative - yes - 
Auton v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General) 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 71, 
2004 SCC 78 
conservative yes - - 
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, 
2004 SCC 79 
liberal yes - yes 
Martineau v. Canada (Minister of 
National Revenue) 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 58, 
2004 SCC 81 
conservative - - - 
R. v. Decorte [2004] S.C.J. No. 77, 
2005 SCC 9 
conservative - yes - 
UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney 
General) 
[2005] S.C.J. No. 11, 
2005 SCC 10 
liberal - - - 
Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney 
General) 
[2005] S.C.J. No. 14, 
2005 SCC 14 
liberal - - yes 
Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney 
General) 
[2005] S.C.J. No. 15, 
2005 SCC 15 
conservative yes - yes 
R. v. Chow [2005] S.C.J. No. 22, 
2005 SCC 24 
conservative - yes - 
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 
2005 SCC 35 
liberal - - - 
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 
2005 SCC 37 
conservative - yes - 
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. 
Ontario 
[2005] S.C.J. No. 41, 
2005 SCC 41 
conservative - - - 
Medovarski v. Canada; Esteban v. 
Canada 
[2005] S.C.J. No. 31, 
2005 SCC 51 
conservative - yes - 
Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec 
Inc. 
[2005] S.C.J. No. 63, 
2005 SCC 62 
liberal - yes - 
R. v. Pires; R. v. Lising [2005] S.C.J. No. 67, 
2005 SCC 66 
conservative - yes - 
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R. v. Henry [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, 
2005 SCC 76 
conservative - yes - 
R. v. Wiles [2005] S.C.J. No. 53, 
2005 SCC 84 
conservative - yes - 
Multani v. Commission scolaire 
Marguerite-Bourgeoys 
[2006] S.C.J. No. 6, 
2006 SCC 6 
liberal yes - - 
R. v. Chaisson [2006] S.C.J. No. 11, 
2006 SCC 11 
liberal - yes - 
R. v. Rodgers [2006] S.C.J. No. 15, 
2006 SCC 15 
conservative - yes - 
U S A v. Ferras; U S A v. Latty [2006] S.C.J. No. 33, 
2006 SCC 33 
conservative - yes - 
United Mexican States v. Ortega; U S A 
v. Fiessel 
[2006] S.C.J. No. 34, 
2006 SCC 34 
liberal - yes - 
R. v. Krieger [2006] S.C.J. No. 47, 
2006 SCC 47 
liberal - yes - 
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration) 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 9, 
2007 SCC 9 
liberal yes yes - 
Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, 
2007 SCC 10 
liberal yes - - 
R. v. Bryan [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, 
2007 SCC 12 
conservative - - - 
R. v. Hape [2007] S.C.J. No. 26, 
2007 SCC 26 
conservative - yes - 
Health Services and Support - Facilities 
Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British 
Columbia 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 
2007 SCC 27 
liberal yes - - 
Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-
Macdonald Corp. 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 30, 
2007 SCC 30 
liberal - - - 
Baier v. Alberta [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, 
2007 SCC 31 
conservative yes - - 
R. v. Clayton [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 
2007 SCC 32 
conservative - yes - 
R. v. Singh [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 
2007 SCC 48 
conservative - yes - 
R. v. Ferguson [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 
2008 SCC 6 
conservative - yes - 
Société des Acadiens et Acadiennes du 
Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Canada 
[2008] S.C.J. No. 15, 
2008 SCC 15 
liberal - - - 
R. v. Kang-Brown [2008] S.C.J. No. 18, 
2008 SCC 18 
liberal - yes - 
R. v. M. (A.) [2008] S.C.J. No. 19, 
2008 SCC 19 
conservative - yes - 
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Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [2008] S.C.J. No. 23, 
2008 SCC 23 
conservative - yes - 
R. v. B. (D.) [2008] S.C.J. No. 25, 
2008 SCC 25 
liberal - yes - 
Canada (Justice) v. Khadr [2008] S.C.J. No. 28, 
2008 SCC 28 
liberal - yes yes 
R. v. Wittwer [2008] S.C.J. No. 33, 
2008 SCC 33 
liberal - yes - 
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration) 
[2008] S.C.J. No. 38, 
2008 SCC 38 
liberal - yes - 
R. v. Kapp [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 
2008 SCC 41 
conservative yes yes - 
Desrochers v. Canada (Industry) [2009] S.C.J. No. 8, 
2009 SCC 8 
conservative - - - 
Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. 
Canada 
[2009] S.C.J. No. 9, 
2009 SCC 9 
conservative yes - - 
 
 
